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GATED COMMUNITIES, HOMOGENEITY AND SOCIAL DISTANCE 
IN LAS VEGAS AND PHOENIX. 
 
(Draft, Do Not Cite Without Permission) 
 
Abstract: 
In this paper we use geographically referenced data for two metropolitan areas in the 
U.S. to test hypotheses about the homogeneity of gated communities and their link to 
segregation.  Based on methodology developed by Renaud Le Goix in his study of Los 
Angeles area, we investigate homogeneity in three aspects: race/ethnicity, economic 
class and age.  The results indicate that gated communities are mostly homogeneous 
enclaves. Their relevance to segregation patterns is structured through buffer zones: 
stronger social discontinuities cannot be found matching gated communities boundaries, 
but at a certain distance from the walls. Overall, gated communities lead to increased 
segregation by reinforcing the already existing levels of racial residential segregation in 
each metropolitan area. 
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GATED COMMUNITIES AND HOMOGENEITY 
IN LAS VEGAS AND PHOENIX. 
 
(Draft, Do Not Cite Without Permission) 
 
From the early academic and public debates about gated communities until now 
scholars and observers have discussed the link between gating and segregation. Not 
surprisingly there is a wide continuum of academic arguments from scholars supporting 
the idea that gating is in fact a process which contributes to residential integration, to 
scholars believing that it is a form of exclusion and segregation.  The level of 
disagreement partly stems from the lack of comprehensive empirical evidence related to 
any of the claims.  In this paper we use geographically referenced data for three 
metropolitan areas in the U.S. to test a hypothesis that the majority of gated 
communities are homogeneous enclaves.  This is the first step in establishing a link 
between gating and segregation.  If indeed gating as a residential process produces 
mostly homogeneous communities this will lead to increased levels of segregation in 
urban areas, known for their diverse populations, particularly in terms of race and 
ethnicity. We then test a second hypothesis that gated communities increase 
segregation at local level.   
Elaborating on a methodology developed by Le Goix in his study of segregation 
patterns produced by gated communities Los Angeles area (2003, 2005b), we 
investigate homogeneity in three aspects: race/ethnicity, economic class and age.  The 
authors apply an index of local social distance, based on multivariate factor analysis and 
further utilize the concept of geographic discontinuity.  Discontinuity is measured as the 
statistically significant level of dissimilarity between two contiguous census areas.  
Based on the analysis of discontinuity the authors are able to determine whether or not 
gated communities create significantly more homogeneous spaces compared to the 
surrounding neighborhoods.  The research contributes to a well established line of 
scholarly inquiries and helps to understand better the link between gating, segregation 
and urban inequality.  The study can also be of interest to a wider audience of policy 
makers, community organizations and the general public. 
In the following pages we first discuss the process of gating and establish the 
relevance of the theory of the club economy to our research goal. The hypothesis of 
predominant homogeneity among gated communities is supported by this theoretical 
model. We then bring two other theoretical models to bear on our hypothesis: the 
sociological perspectives of spatial assimilation and place stratification. The two 
perspectives have generated a series of important empirical findings related to 
residential patterns in metropolitan U.S. and we find support within there context, as 
well. After that, in the paper, we discuss the methodology used to study our hypothesis 
and finally report the results from the study. 
 
1 The Process of Gating 
Gated communities have been defined spatially in two major ways, either as sub-units 
within more general territories or as independent spatial units.  One group of scholars 
considers GCs as a facet of large planned communities or Common Interest 
Developments (McKenzie 1994, 2003; Luymes 1997; Kennedy 1995; Gordon 2004).  
Alternatively, others argue that the existence of fences and walls, and security features 
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(guards, surveillance cameras) distinguish GCs as a residential setting that is 
significantly different from non-gated enclaves (Blakely and Snyder 1997; Le Goix 2003; 
Low 2003; Vesselinov, et al., 2007).  
The latter approach is more important if we want to understand the specific ways in 
which GCs change the residential patterns in urban America.  On the one hand, a very 
important institutional aspect of GCs is that, like all private neighborhoods, they are 
characterized by homeowner associations, where elected boards oversee the common 
property and establish covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CC&Rs) as part of the 
deed.  However, on the other hand, unlike CIDs, planned communities, or even 
individual gated residences, GCs are surrounded by a secured barrier which denies all 
public access not only to personal residences, but also to the area’s streets, sidewalks, 
and neighborhood amenities.  Therefore, for the purposes of our analyses we adopt 
Low’s definition of a GC: “[a] residential development surrounded by walls, fences, or 
earth banks covered with bushes and shrubs, with a secured entrance” (Low, 2003:12).   
1.1 Modern trends 
Two main trends in GCs have been observed since 1970s: the privatization of entire 
cities and the diversification of GCs by race, class and tenure.  While GCs began as 
individual residential neighborhoods, the concept has been expanded to encompass 
private urban governance of entire cities (e.g. Rolling Hills, Hidden Hills, Canyon Lake, 
and Leisure World, CA).  In some recently incorporated cities, an important share of the 
residents live in GCs (Calabasas, Rancho Santa Margarita, Dana Point, all in California).  
This happens for two primary reasons.  On the one hand, gated households aim to 
prevent a potential annexation by a less affluent community looking for an expanded tax 
base.  On the other, they aim to protect local lifestyles, values, and planning control (Le 
Goix, 2005a).  After incorporation, local affairs are shared with private homeowners 
associations (HOAs), which take charge of road maintenance, security and compliance 
with land use regulations and restrictive covenants.  These “minimal cities” also reduce 
operation costs by contracting with the county and other public agencies to supply public 
services, such as police, water, sewers and fire (Miller, 1981).  Instead of acting as a 
separate entity, minimal cities are extensions of their HOAs.  
The second important trend is that gated living is no longer the exclusive option only for 
the very top tier of American society.  Gated enclaves are spreading across middle 
classes, as well as across minority groups (Lang and Danielson, 1997; Grant and 
Mittelsteadt, 2004; Sanchez et al., 2005; Vesselinov, 2006a).  In addition, Sanchez et al. 
(2005) find that a higher percentage of foreign-born individuals live in GCs than outside.  
In her study of gated communities in Southern California, Wilson-Doenges (2000) finds 
that GCs exist for both high-income and low-income households, a large change from 
the earliest GCs.   
There are also recorded differences between owners and renters (Sanchez et. al, 2005; 
Vesselinov, 2006b).  Overall, renters are more likely to select GCs compared to 
homeowners.  Comparing whites and Latinos, Vesselinov (2006b) has found some 
additional differences. College educated Latino and white owners are more likely to live 
in GCs compared to those with lesser educational attainment, regardless of social class.  
Upper class Latino and white renters are more likely to select gated residences, 
regardless of educational attainment.  On the one hand, since homeownership requires 
a much more serious investment of resources, the householders who have achieved this 
tenure status can more easily be differentiated by education than by social class.  On the 
other hand, renters constitute a more diverse group in terms of available resources and 
therefore social class seems to carry more differentiating weight than education.  These 
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differences notwithstanding, the overall conclusion from the analysis is that for Latinos 
and whites alike, and owners and renters alike, higher educational attainment and higher 
social class position increase the odds of selecting a gated residence; GCs still 
constitute more affluent enclaves.   
 
1.2 Theoretical Models 
1.2.1 Gated Communities as “Club Goods” 
The “club economy” theory suggests that GCs are produced as territorial “club goods” in 
a similar fashion to private social clubs.  It is argued that GCs are not public spaces, nor 
can they be considered as completely private spaces, because the HOAs manage public 
areas, streets and facilities for the collective use of many member-residents.  Under the 
neo-classical interpretations of the private realm, the rapid growth of GCs provides 
support for the view that the public provision of collective goods and services is often 
inefficient; the residents are voting with their feet in a Tieboutean world (Foldvary, 1994).  
Newman’s studies for the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(Newman, 1974, 1996) are often cited as evidence that gated enclaves are politically 
and financially sustainable institutions (Foldvary, 1994).  The sustainability is ensured by 
the existence of the HOAs, which have three basic characteristics: (i) elected boards act 
as neighborhood decision makers, (ii) contracts govern resident’s behavior (CC&Rs), 
and (iii) monthly fees finance local amenities and services (McKenzie, 1994).  
Interpreting GCs as neither completely private (according to the provision of collective 
goods) nor public, the club economy model provides a framework to analyze the 
territorial management of gated enclaves. 
The argument about the better efficiency of the club provision yields three underlying 
propositions.  Firstly, compared to municipal-scale governance micro-scale collective 
decision making leads to a closer fit between the demand for and supply of local 
collective goods and services.  This consensual decision making creates a certain level 
of social homogeneity: buyers and developers are both pushing for GCs with a level of 
services and amenities that fits a homogeneous set of tenants.  Secondly, most local 
public goods are consumed by sub-sets of the wider public and are therefore better 
supplied as “club goods,” where members of sport or leisure clubs use facilities, such as 
swimming pools, golf courses, beaches, volley ball fields, airfields (Webster, 2003; 
Webster and Lai, 2003).  Thirdly, reorganizing a public city into a city of clubs may 
increase funds for public bodies of government.  Municipalities capitalize on this extra 
source of revenue by off-loading responsibilities to HOAs (McKenzie, 1994).  As a 
consequence, the search for security is only a partial explanation of the sprawl of GCs.  
Gated neighborhoods have enabled public authorities to manage growth with greater 
fiscal sustainability.  It is documented that in California (McKenzie, 1994; Le Goix, 
2005a), gating is highly correlated with fiscal gaps progressively experienced by local 
government bodies.   
The “club economy” perspective leads to the conclusion that GCs are mostly 
homogeneous enclaves.  On one hand, security features incur substantial cost for gated 
homeowners: for infrastructure and maintenance.  This economic selection of residents 
tends to produce social homogeneity.  On the other hand, the private access guarantees 
the exclusive use of a site, based on similar needs and preferences, which is also leads 
to homogeneity.  If GCs are homogeneous then they will lead to higher segregation, 
which is considered by many scholars to be one of the territorial outcomes of gating.   
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1.2.2 Spatial Assimilation Model 
The spatial assimilation perspective poses that as minorities accumulate more cultural, 
social and economic capital the chances that they will enter more affluent, middle-class, 
white neighborhoods increase.  Since suburban neighborhoods exhibit these 
characteristics (Logan and Schneider, 1982) the process of spatial assimilation is most 
pronounced in these areas.  As Alba and Logan argue (1991:432) “suburbanization is an 
important indicator to the extent to which minorities are becoming integrated more fully 
into society.”  In many ways choosing a GC residence resembles entering a more 
affluent white neighborhood because GCs have historically functioned as wealthy white 
enclaves (Blakely and Snyder, 1997; Low, 2003).  Some of the earlier evidence about 
the process of spatial assimilation comes from the work of Massey and Mullan (1984), 
who show that, when blacks and Latinos move into an area that is predominantly white, 
succession sometimes occurs.  In the case of Latinos however, the residential choice of 
whites often depends on the specific characteristics of the Latinos moving into the area: 
assimilation more readily occurs for Latinos and Asians of higher socioeconomic status 
(Massey and Mullan, 1984; Logan, Alba, and Leung, 1996; Alba et al., 1999).  At the 
same time Alba, Logan, and Stults (2000) find that in three metropolitan areas, Los 
Angeles, Miami, and San Francisco, the majority status of whites within the suburbs is 
diminishing.  This trend may indicate future patterns; as the number of Latinos continues 
to increase rapidly, they may be living in suburban neighborhoods comprised mostly of 
other Latinos, or possibly other minorities.  
Therefore, based on the spatial assimilation model it seems likely that some of the most 
affluent Latinos and Asians would join whites in suburban gated residences 
(homogeneity based on income).  At the same time, moving into a predominantly white 
gated or non-gated suburban neighborhood is not the only option for upwardly mobile 
minorities: affluent minority members may be establishing their own suburban ethnic 
communities, including GCs (which then will also be homogeneous based on 
race/ethnicity).  
 
1.2.3 Place Stratification Model 
According to Alba and Logan (1991:432) the stratification model is warranted by the 
racial segmentation of housing markets, which has been widely confirmed in the 
experiences of blacks (Massey and Denton, 1993; Oliver and Shapiro, 1995; Briggs, 
2005), as well as Latinos (Betancur, 1996; Logan, Alba, and Leung, 1996; Alba, Logan, 
and Stults, 2000; Kandel and Cromartie, 2003).   
The persistent level of black-white residential segregation has been given a central place 
in the scholarly literature.  The explanations about such trends focus on consistent 
housing discrimination on the part of the white majority and array of federal government 
policies (Galster, 1988; Massey and Denton, 1993; Oliver and Shapiro, 1995).  Black-
white segregation in metropolitan U.S. has been continuously high (Massey and Denton, 
1989) and across social classes.  Middle-class blacks are somewhat less segregated 
from whites than poor blacks, but the whites they share neighborhoods with are less 
affluent (Alba, Logan and Stults, 2000).  While Massey and Denton (1989, 1993) argue 
that, overall, blacks are much more segregated from whites than Latinos, other research 
shows that both blacks and Latinos are more segregated from whites than Asians 
(Social Structures for Social Sciences, 2001).  A study of the most recent trends in 
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segregation illustrates that black-white segregation has declined at the national level 
between 1980 and 2000, but the average of 65 percent in 2000 is the highest among all 
minorities.  At the same time, in metropolitan areas, Latino-white and Asian-white 
segregation has increased to 52 and to 42 percent respectively (Logan, Stults and 
Farley, 2004).  
Between 1970 and 1980 and again in the 1990s, Hispanic-white segregation was much 
below the level of black segregation, but it has substantially increased in many urban 
areas where the population of Hispanic immigrants has been growing (Massey and 
Denton, 1987; Logan, Alba, and Leung, 1996).  Therefore, while Latinos continue to 
migrate to the U.S. and often select areas where there is a pre-existing large Latino 
population, they face greater residential segregation in these areas.  
Latinos and blacks also face increasingly acute economic segregation in the 1980s 
(Massey and Eggers, 1993; Abramson, Tobin and VanderGoot, 1995; Jargowsky, 1996).  
Although the levels of economic segregation (regardless of the measure used) for 
whites, blacks and Latinos are generally much lower compared to levels of racial 
residential segregation, they are increasing for all groups since 1970 (Jargowsky, 
1996:990). According to the author, this finding is robust across many metropolitan 
areas which differ substantially in their economic base, housing, and poverty trends.   
The levels of racial and economic residential segregation for blacks mean that it will be 
rather unusual to find even affluent blacks among whites in the same GCs.  Moreover, 
the historical legacy of discrimination and segregation further makes blacks unlikely 
candidates to participate in such residential enclosures with whites.  Among the 
minorities blacks are least likely to gate (Sanchez, et al., 2005; Vesselinov, et al., 2007) 
and our expectation is that they will be least likely to share GCs with whites.  Among 
Asians and Latinos the most affluent members may select to join whites in GCs.  
However, the residential preferences and ethnic enclave experiences among Asians and 
Latinos may lead to consolidation of their own (homogeneous) GCs rather then sharing 
such communities with whites.    
 
2 Gating and Segregation 
As research shows, gating and segregation are both tightly connected to the issues of 
land use regulations and exclusionary zoning, especially in the areas where residential 
subdivisions are being developed.  Literature has extensively demonstrated how 
neighborhood movements, close-knit local residential governance and exclusionary 
zoning produce increased segregation (Purcell, 1997; Ihlanfeldt, 2004). 
There is a rather consistent tendency in GCs research to link gating as a residential 
process with segregation (Blakely and Snyder, 1997; Caldeira, 2000; Low, 2003; Blandy 
et al., 2003; Le Goix, 2003, 2005b; Gordon, 2004; Atkinson and Flint, 2004; Manzi and 
Smith-Bowers, 2005; Vesselinov, 2006a).  A continuum of arguments exists about the 
similarities of the two processes, which stretches from scholars contending that gating is 
a process of private residential choices, which leads to integration (Manzi and Smith-
Bowers, 2005), to scholars arguing that gating is an extension of segregation (Caldeira, 
2000).  The empirical evidence that support any of the arguments however is quite 
limited; therefore the proposed research will make an important contribution by 
empirically examining the structural link between gating and segregation.  
At the one end of the spectrum, Manzi and Smith-Bowers (2005:348) regard GCs as 
examples of “the growth of privately owned collective goods such as shopping malls, 
business parks, golf clubs, etc.”  The authors present two case studies where upper 
scale GCs are constructed in lower income areas, arguing in favor of those areas’ 
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integration.  At the other end of the continuum, Low’s (2003) study, conducted in two 
GCs, in San Antonio, TX, and in Queens, NY, shows that many GC residents fear non-
specified “others” from “outside the gates” and this fear justified the move into a GC.  
Low discovered that GC residents were especially concerned about “ethnic change” in 
the neighborhoods they moved from and had covert concerns about social order, social 
control, xenophobia, and ethnocentrism.   
In a California area study, Gordon (2004) investigates the link between planned 
developments and residential segregation.  Using data from the 1990 STF3A and public 
reports filed with the California Department of Real Estate, the author concludes that the 
planned developments are, on average, less diverse with respect to race, but more 
diverse in respect to income.  The author finds that the contribution of planned 
developments to overall metropolitan segregation is minor.  Since GCs are included in 
the larger category of planned developments, the results relate to GCs only by 
association.  
 
2.1 Research Design and Methods 
Overall, the empirical evidence collected so far is inconclusive about the impact of GCs 
on urban areas. Le Goix’s (2003; 2005b) research methodology constitutes a 
comprehensive approach to the study of GCs, but is limited to Los Angeles metropolitan 
area. Le Goix studies 219 GCs in the Los Angeles region, based on Thomas Guides 
Maps and Census 2000 (SF1 and SF3).  This research shows that (1) the combined 
effects of property values and socio-economic structure create more segregation 
between gated block groups and abutting areas than in non-gated neighborhoods. (2) 
GCs are twice as likely to be separated by age characteristics than other neighborhoods. 
(3) Findings show that GCs are less likely to be segregated by race or ethnicity than 
other neighborhoods at a local scale. This papers aims at presenting new evidences, 
based on the same research design, in two other metropolitan areas, so that we might 
ultimately, compare Phoenix and Las Vegas with Los Angeles ; the interest being to 
compare three of the most dynamic metropolitan areas in South Western regions.  
 
2.1.1 A GIS of gated communities: 
Using Geographical Information System (GIS) we have identified the exact location of 
GCs in Phoenix and Las Vegas, available through Thomas Guides®1, the same way it 
has been done in Le Goix’s research (2003). We then match the newly constructed data 
for GCs with Census data at block group level.  Using data from Census 20002 will then 
allow to identify the characteristics of the population living within and outside of the gated 
areas. 
 
                                                
1
 The Thomas Guides®. The company publishes interactive maps that identify gated streets and gated 
neighborhoods. These files also provide information on military bases, airfields, airports, prisons, 
amusement parks and colleges, some of which may also contain private streets with restricted access. The 
data set used in this paper has been obtained by Elena Vesselinov and is licensed to University of South 
Carolina. 
2
 2000 Census data, SF1 anda SF3.  The 100 percent file (SF1) is used for estimating the percent of 
households located in gated enclaves.  The sample data file (SF3) is used for the income characteristics. 
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2.1.2 A local social distance index : a spatial analysis of social distance between 
census block groups.  
The analysis at the neighborhood level primarily measures the social distance between 
residents of one gated census block groups and adjacent (gated or non-gated) census 
block groups. Segregation, concentration and dissimilarity indices are known to be 
sensitive to spatial autocorrelation (Apparicio, 2000; Grasland, et al., 2000; Dawkins, 
2004). It is well know that these indices usually ignore spatial patterns, depending on the 
level of spatial autocorrelation (White, 1983; Massey and Denton, 1989; Dawkins, 2004). 
To study segregation patterns at a local level, we therefore need to implement a function 
of distance in the measure to account for the gradient and the proximity effects, either a 
metric distance (Euclidian) or topological distance (adjacency). The proposed local 
social distance index (SDI) accounts for spatial autocorrelation issues, as it measures 
the level of social discontinuity between two adjacent block groups. When can then 
compare the SDI between gated areas and abutting block groups, to SDIs computed 
between block groups located in non-gated areas. 
 
Hypotheses: As earlier mentioned, private governance leads to an implicit selection of 
the owners.  Homogeneity of the neighborhood is ensured through design guidelines, 
age restrictions or a selective club membership.  The first hypothesis to test in this study 
is that GCs are mostly homogeneous enclaves.  The second hypothesis is related to the 
link between gating and segregation. The process of gating and the exclusiveness 
create a border.  The border separates two territorial systems: the territorial system of 
the GC, and the urban space where it is located. We expect to estimate the effect of 
gating over social segregation, relying on the following assumption: if the overall 
differentiations occurring between gated enclaves and their vicinities are higher than the 
differentiations usually observed in the urban area between two adjacent neighborhoods, 
then there is a high probability that GCs indeed produce increased segregation. 
 
Methods: Factorial axis will be provided by a multivariate analysis (principal component 
analysis) at the level of census block groups. Contributing independent variables will 
help defining the main factorial axis of the PCA results. The most contributing factorial 
axis will be used to measure the local social distance between adjacent block groups.  
The spatial analysis in this part aims at measuring the impact of topological distance 
(like a border) on social distance.  This method was successfully implemented to study 
the differentiation processes produced by national borders on demographic patterns 
(Decroly and Grasland, 1992; Grasland, Mathian, & Favaro, 2000) and differentiation 
processes produced by school social patterns (François, 1998).  It is now widely used for 
European Union planning policies (ESPON) to produce a multilevel analysis of 
inequalities and social patterns (Grasland and Lizzi, 2003).  
It is nevertheless challenging to evaluate the effects of gating on segregation patterns for 
three reasons: 
- Firstly, it is assumed that social patterns in GCs are almost consistent with their 
neighborhood, in order to insure the attractiveness of the development for potential 
buyers.  As a consequence the method seeks to sort out the effects of walls and gates 
on each social characteristic (age, race, economic status).  It relies on a multivariate 
analysis (principal component analysis or factor analysis) to test whether a GC boundary 
fits any sensitive shift in the statistical definition of social areas. Indeed, although GCs 
locate within a social environment that is close to their own social characteristics, the 
gating of the area delineates a “snob value” (Blakely and Snyder, 1997), and a slight 
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change in status, in age, etc.  For instance, within a Hispanic middle-class neighborhood 
with a certain level of diversity in age, property values, etc., a GC will be home of middle-
class Hispanics, with homogeneous property values and probably older and/or wealthier 
residents than in the immediate surroundings.  
- Secondly, the implementation of this test relies on a function of distance based on the 
adjacency between census areas.  Classical segregation indices fit well the needs of an 
analysis at metropolitan geographical level, but do not work as well when studying 
segregation at local geographical level (Apparicio, 2000) because spatial patterns, 
gradients and spatial autocorrelation interfere with the results. 
To address this problem we use a local social distance index (Decroly and Grasland, 
1992; François, 1998; 2002).  The index equals the difference between the two 
contiguous areas i and j on a continuous factor X.  The factor X is extracted from the 
factor analysis, and describes the relative coordinates of each area on a factorial axis 
produced by the joint effect of all independent variables.  A discontinuity means that 
there is a statistically significant level of dissimilarity between two contiguous block 
groups.  It is mapped as a segment materializing the level of discontinuity, and 
compared with GCs’ boundary layout. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Spatial analysis methodology at the local level. 
Three vicinity levels around gated communities (Le Goix, 2005b). 
Number of segments provided in the case study of Los Angeles. 
 
 
Thirdly, a lot of GCs are only a small part of a block group. Two different subsets of data 
were built : gated block groups (Figure 3, case A) and non-gated block groups.  We will 
also consider a third subset of data, taking into considerations block groups where small 
GCs are located (Figure 3, case B).  
The method does not consider the block group spatial entity, but the unique boundary 
separating two adjacent block groups, called segments. As shown on Figure 1, this 
allows a multilevel analysis of segregation given three spatial contexts:  
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(1) A first vicinity level applies to the segments between a GC and its immediate 
surrounding, where block groups’ and GCs’ definitions perfectly fit each other 
(case A). In this case, this vicinity level will account for the discontinuities 
associated with every large GC, and how they differ from abutting communities. 
(2) A second vicinity level characterizes the dissimilarities observed in the 
environment where a GC is located. We test whether the stronger discontinuity is 
produced by a GC or by its surrounding neighborhoods. The latter means that a 
GC might be surrounded by a very homogeneous social or ethnic buffer zone.  
This level is defined both by the segments in contact with block groups adjacent 
to the precedent level (case A), and by the segments of any block group where a 
small GC is located (case B).  
(3) A third vicinity level encompasses every segment observed between adjacent 
block groups for the entire metropolitan region. A local social distance index is 
statistically significant if above the mean for the metropolitan areas.  
 
3 Different gated communities, different metropolitan areas, 
different differentiation patterns. 
 
3.1 Block groups, social patterns and local homogeneity. 
Three main characteristics of the socio-economic differentiation are analyzed, using the 
following variables for each block group in each metropolitan region studied in 2000: 
(1) Socio-economic status: median property value; percent of owner-occupied housing 
units; (2) Race: percent Whites; percent Hispanics, percent Blacks; percent Asians; 
percent Native Americans; (3) Age: percent of people less than 18 years old; percent 18-
24; percent 25-44; percent 45-64; percent more than 65 (Table 1a and 1b). 
 
 
 
Table 1a. Descriptive statistics, Phoenix 
Sample N Min Max 
1st 
Quartile Median 
3rd 
Quartile Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Variation 
coefficient 
p_hispan 2113 0 100 7,8 15,1 37,3 25,2 23,9 0,95 
p_white 2113 0 100 66,9 83,1 90,8 77,1 18,2 0,24 
p_black 2113 0 78 1,2 2,4 4,5 3,7 4,9 1,32 
p_native 2113 0 99 0,4 1,0 2,2 2,0 5,5 2,82 
p_asian 2113 0 100 0,7 1,5 2,7 2,2 3,5 1,62 
under18 2113 0 99 20,8 27,7 33,3 25,9 10,3 0,40 
age18to24 2113 0 96 6,3 9,0 12,4 10,0 6,7 0,67 
age25to44 2113 0 100 27,7 31,8 36,2 30,9 10,1 0,33 
age45to64 2113 0 67 15,0 18,9 24,8 20,4 7,8 0,38 
age65plus 2113 0 97 4,3 7,2 13,4 12,9 16,8 1,30 
medval 2113 9999 1000001 79725,0 106300,0 147075,0 126580,8 91032,4 0,72 
medincm 2113 4583 200001 31638,8 43536,5 60128,5 48376,6 23463,0 0,49 
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Table 1b. Descriptive statistics, Vegas 
Sample N Min. Max 
1st 
Quartile Median 
3rd 
Quartile Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Variation 
coefficient 
p_hispan 832 0 85 8,5 13,5 25,6 19,9 17,0 0,855 
p_white 832 5 100 66,2 76,9 84,3 73,7 15,7 0,214 
p_black 832 0 88 3,5 5,8 9,4 8,5 10,9 1,285 
p_native 832 0 80 0,4 0,7 1,0 0,9 2,9 3,290 
p_asian 832 0 30 2,2 4,1 6,4 4,8 3,7 0,758 
under18 832 0 67 20,5 25,7 30,4 24,8 8,4 0,341 
age18to24 832 0 37 6,0 7,9 10,0 8,3 3,8 0,461 
age25to44 832 0 100 27,5 31,6 35,3 30,8 8,2 0,265 
age45to64 832 0 100 19,2 23,2 27,9 24,1 8,1 0,337 
age65plus 832 0 79 6,5 9,1 13,6 12,0 10,5 0,878 
powner 832 0 100 45,2 76,7 89,3 66,0 28,7 0,434 
medval 832 0 1000001 94900,0 126650,0 164125,0 138237,3 86466,3 0,625 
 
The Principal Component Analysis (PCA) demonstrates the very high structuring of 
socio-spatial segregation in both cities: 4 factors describe 70% of total variance between 
block groups. 
In Phoenix (Table 2a and 2b) and Las Vegas (Table 3a and 3b), the first factor explains 
more than one third of total variance (respectively 36,5 % and 36,9 %). It describes the 
socio-economic contrasts associated with race and age: White, aged and wealthy 
neighborhoods of owners, in opposition to the young, Hispanic or Black districts.  In 
previous studies, this was also how factor 1 described patterns in the Los Angeles area 
(Le Goix, 2003), such findings being consistent with almost all studies on social areas in 
US cities since Bell and Sevky (1955). 
A second factor stands for another 14,4% of total variance in Phoenix, and 13,4% in Las 
Vegas. Interpretation is also consistent with other comparable studies, as factor 2 
describes the mixed components of age and life-cycle (owners, renters, family with 
children or single adult population). It isolates on one hand the effect of persons between 
25 and 44 years old with children (under 18), living in areas with percentage of owners ; 
and on the other end the socio-spatial isolation of retired population (more than 65 years 
old). 
 
Factors 3 and 4 both yield different interpretation, depending on the city. Phoenix’ 
profiles is very close to Los Angeles’ in previous research: it isolates the effect of racial 
segregation in the middle class. In Phoenix, it discriminates Hispanics and Asian, along 
with age criteria, everything being equal regarding the social status. In Las Vegas, 
however, the social structuring of Sin City is driven by the labor market, highly 
specialized in the game, gambling and shows industries, and indeed favors employment 
of a younger population than in any other city. The consequence is that factor 3 in Las 
Vegas isolates on one hand family with children and on the other hand young adults (18-
25 years old) neighborhoods, South and West of the Strip. 
Factor 4, in Las Vegas, takes into account the same ethnic segregation effect regardless 
of social status. Once again, Las Vegas shows a rather specific pattern, with a spatial 
association of Hispanic and White, opposed to Black persons, with no significant effect 
of wealth and ownership. In Phoenix, factor 4 isolates the very significant presence of 
Native Americans in the area, opposed to all other categories in this city. 
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Table 2a. PCA Eigenvalues and variance in Phoenix 
Factor Eigenvalue variance % cumulative 
1 4,381 36,51 36,51 
2 1,733 14,44 50,95 
3 1,335 11,13 62,08 
4 0,966 8,05 70,14 
 
Table 2b. Definition of factors 1 to 4 in Phoenix 
  Eigenvectors     
Squared cosines of the 
variables Contribution     
  F1 F2 F3 F4 F1 F2 F3 F4 F1 F2 F3 F4 
p_white -0,858 0,176 -0,216 -0,091 0,735 0,031 0,047 0,008 0,168 0,018 0,035 0,009 
p_hispan 0,763 -0,226 0,379 -0,151 0,582 0,051 0,144 0,023 0,133 0,030 0,107 0,023 
p_black 0,513 -0,153 0,093 -0,205 0,263 0,023 0,009 0,042 0,060 0,014 0,007 0,043 
p_native 0,321 -0,180 0,078 0,904 0,103 0,032 0,006 0,817 0,023 0,019 0,005 0,845 
p_asian 0,073 0,393 -0,496 -0,030 0,005 0,154 0,246 0,001 0,001 0,089 0,184 0,001 
under18 0,617 0,427 0,555 -0,029 0,381 0,182 0,308 0,001 0,087 0,105 0,231 0,001 
age18to24 0,672 -0,058 -0,487 0,020 0,452 0,003 0,237 0,000 0,103 0,002 0,178 0,000 
age25to44 0,556 0,600 -0,251 -0,023 0,309 0,360 0,063 0,001 0,071 0,208 0,047 0,001 
age45to64 -0,730 0,229 0,163 0,147 0,533 0,053 0,026 0,022 0,122 0,030 0,020 0,022 
age65plus -0,644 -0,705 -0,071 -0,044 0,415 0,497 0,005 0,002 0,095 0,287 0,004 0,002 
medval -0,443 0,508 -0,003 0,213 0,197 0,258 0,000 0,045 0,045 0,149 0,000 0,047 
powner -0,636 0,296 0,495 -0,071 0,404 0,087 0,245 0,005 0,092 0,050 0,183 0,005 
 
 
Table 3a. PCA Eigenvalues and variance in Las Vegas 
 Factor Eigenvalue Variance % Cumulative 
1 4,427 36,9 36,9 
2 1,607 13,4 50,29 
3 1,326 11,06 61,35 
4 1,0497 8,75 70,1 
 
Table 3b. Definition of factors 1 to 4 in Las Vegas 
  Eigenvectors     
Squared cosines of the 
variables Contribution     
  F1 F2 F3 F4 F1 F2 F3 F4 F1 F2 F3 F4 
p_white -0,816 0,322 -0,132 -0,336 0,665 0,103 0,017 0,113 0,150 0,064 0,013 0,108 
p_hispan 0,716 -0,246 0,065 -0,251 0,512 0,060 0,004 0,063 0,116 0,038 0,003 0,060 
p_black 0,513 -0,361 0,324 0,630 0,263 0,130 0,105 0,397 0,059 0,081 0,079 0,378 
p_native 0,093 -0,163 0,115 -0,459 0,009 0,027 0,013 0,211 0,002 0,017 0,010 0,201 
p_asian 0,059 0,337 -0,616 0,400 0,003 0,113 0,379 0,160 0,001 0,070 0,286 0,153 
under18 0,629 0,381 0,577 -0,032 0,396 0,145 0,333 0,001 0,089 0,090 0,251 0,001 
age18to24 0,780 -0,075 -0,316 -0,157 0,609 0,006 0,100 0,025 0,138 0,003 0,075 0,023 
age25to44 0,631 0,545 -0,285 -0,041 0,398 0,297 0,081 0,002 0,090 0,184 0,061 0,002 
age45to64 -0,791 -0,142 -0,038 0,118 0,626 0,020 0,001 0,014 0,141 0,012 0,001 0,013 
age65plus -0,669 -0,594 -0,098 0,024 0,448 0,352 0,010 0,001 0,101 0,219 0,007 0,001 
powner -0,552 0,405 0,525 0,018 0,305 0,164 0,275 0,000 0,069 0,102 0,207 0,000 
medval -0,439 0,437 0,086 0,253 0,193 0,191 0,007 0,064 0,044 0,119 0,006 0,061 
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3.2 Social walls 
3.2.1 Gated communities profiles 
Assuming the social patterns within census block groups is reasonably homogeneous; 
Maps 1 and 2 give a first insight of social patterns in gated communities and in their local 
environment. In Phoenix, more than half of block groups with GCs are located within 
average profile, middle class White and Asian neighborhoods, yet another evidence of 
the social diffusion of residential enclosure which cannot be conceived anymore as a 
real estate product for the most privileged ones. About one fifth of GCs are defined as 
very wealthy and upper-class White and older population. A small minority of gated 
communities also seem to develop in Hispanic and Black neighborhoods. Map shows 
that larger enclaves are located in White and wealthier areas, whereas smaller tracts are 
in-fill developments closer to central areas populated with Black and Hispanic 
communities. 
Las Vegas GCs profile indicates a stronger homogeneity between the different kinds of 
gated developments. There are almost no small infill development like seen in Phoenix, 
and almost all gated areas are developed on the Western side of the metropolitan area, 
and some of them are located on the South-East corner. With almost no central location 
for GCs, social patterns are consistent with spatial patterns, being close to white, aged 
population (45-65 years old, with higher property values), as described on map 2. Gates 
and walls seem to correspond to the very powerful effect of racial patterns, with very 
high racial contrasts within a very short range of distance from gated enclaves. 
Nevertheless, age profiles in GCs seem to be quite diverse, which yields the hypothesis 
that developers propose different kind of services and amenities according to the 
targeted age of prospective residents.  
3.2.2 Local increase of segregation 
The factorial axis, being a continuous scale, allows a comparison of the relative position 
of block groups. For each segment between two adjacent block groups, we construct a 
Social Distance Index (SDI), calculating the difference between block groups’ 
eigenvalues for each factor. Considering the absolute value of the SDI, the higher the 
absolute value is, the stronger the discontinuity.  
SDIs were calculated for each of the four factors previously described, for each of the 
three vicinity groups of segments (Figure 1). Table 4 summarizes the number of 
segments between block groups for each metropolitan area studied, and for each 
geographical level analyzed. 
 
Table 4. Number of boundaries between census block groups for each 
geographical level. 
 Los Angeles* Phoenix Las Vegas 
Number of block groups 12549 2113 832 
Number of line segments between BGs:    
Level 1. Gated communities, boundaries 308 95 162 
Level 2. In the vicinity of GC 6349 1600 1203 
Level 3. All block groups in metro area 33800 5301 2173 
*Data for the Los Angeles area provided for comparison  
purpose. See Le Goix, 2005b for detailed results.  
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Map 1. Gated communities in their socio-economic environment and level of 
discontinuities produced in their vicinity in Phoenix. 
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Map 2. Gated communities in their socio-economic environment and level of 
discontinuities produced in their vicinity in Las Vegas. 
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SDIs are mapped so that we can visualize the level of social discontinuity produced in 
gated areas. The “noodles” drawing provides qualitative information regarding the shape 
of the discontinuities, under the assumption that a continuously shaped discontinuity 
outlines an independent territorial system with a strong social homogeneity highly 
differentiated from the outside, whereas a poorly shaped discontinuity would only outline 
a subsystem included within a larger territorial system (i.e. a municipality). Where the 
shapes of discontinuities are simple and circumscribe the walls, it clearly demonstrates 
that gated communities actually build a specific territorial system within their urban 
environment. Within a wide range around gated communities, the shapes of the 
discontinuities are rather complex and depend on the shape of census block boundaries. 
They nevertheless act as evidences of major discontinuities within a certain range from 
the walls, thus including some gated communities within a buffer zone of homogeneous 
social patterns (Decroly and Grasland, 1992; François, 1998; Le Goix, 2003, 2005b). 
We are thus able to determine whether a block group containing one or more GCs is 
more likely to be more homogeneous than other abutting BGs in the vicinity; and by 
doing so builds a social wall that appears as a significant level of discontinuity. In such a 
case, if the SDI is above the average of SDIs in the whole metropolitan area, maps can 
be interpreted according to the width of the line segment, which directly translates the 
strength of the social wall separating one BG and another (SDIs mapped according to 
Standard Deviation above average). 
 
Socio-economic gradients and buffer zones 
At first glance, GCs do not appear to systematically produce significant discontinuities 
(Level 1), and this is for two reasons. First, the classical core-periphery socio-economic 
gradient is very powerful in producing strong inequalities between block groups. It is a 
well acknowledged fact that classical segregation patterns are already so strong that 
GCs might only have marginal and very local effects on these spatial patterns. 
Second, GCs in Las Vegas and Phoenix reproduce a pattern in their location choice that 
can be described as a “buffer zone” effect: GCs’ developers obviously locate their 
proposed schemes according to socio-spatial patterns, which prospective buyers are 
fully aware of. Indeed, most GCs are just located within very homogeneous 
neighborhoods, and this location within a buffer zone is not incidental, but rationally 
promoted by the developers choosing locations within an environment protected from 
the deterrent effects of social and ethnic diversity for the prospective buyers (Le Goix 
2005b). This profound trend was found in GCs in Southern California, and evidences in 
Phoenix and Las Vegas concur with previous findings. 
According to factor 1 (socio-economic status associated with race and age), this buffer 
zone effect is obvious in the North-East sector of Phoenix, where dozens of small and 
large GCs are located in a close-knit pattern; they produce almost no discontinuity with 
neighbors which have very comparable socio-economic profiles. We observe the same 
local system of homogeneity in the South-West part of Las Vegas, as well as in the 
south part, where most GCs are located within rose-colored areas of the map. This 
homogeneity effect is reinforced when observing factor 2 maps (life cycle and effect of 
age): the North East part of Phoenix and the Western part of Las Vegas seem very 
homogeneous. 
 
Strong discontinuities around gated communities 
The buffer-zone effect is reinforced when observing the numerous significant 
discontinuities mapped in lighter blue shades (Level 2). Significant SDIs may be 
observed in the close vicinity of GCs, especially where no significant SDI appear around 
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one specific GC (Level 1). This is, for instance, the case in the central-eastern and 
South-East sides of Phoenix metro (factors 1, 2 and 3), where numerous very significant 
Level 2 discontinuities appear, demonstrating that GCs are indeed located within an 
homogeneous environment, but a “social wall” is located at a topological distance of one 
or two block group from the GC. In Las Vegas, this effect is obvious in central-North and 
eastern district of the city (factors 2, 3 and 4): these neighborhoods are more ethnically 
diverse than on Westside-Las Vegas, and GCs were indeed produced as small infill 
developments and urban renewal strategies (McKenzie, 2005): the “social wall” does not 
lie between one specific GC and its neighbors, but indeed between the homogenous 
area were the GC is located and abutting block groups. 
 
Some discontinuities actually fit GCs’ boundaries 
At last, in some cases, strong discontinuities actually fit the walls of GCs (mapped in 
dark blue shades). These cases are rare for at least three reasons:  
- First, according to data used, only few GCs can be matched to BGs as “Level 1” 
case studies : there are only 14 block groups with boundaries actually matching 
GCs’ boundaries in Phoenix, and 19 cases in Las Vegas  ;  
- Second, many very large GCs are part of a larger block group, along with other 
kind of gated or non-gated residential developments of various kind, that can only 
be described as Level 2 GCs. There is no easy way to recover this loss of 
information by allocating population and socio-economic profile to these GCs, 
without knowledge from a field survey regarding homogeneity or diversity within 
each of these block groups. This might be a sensitive bias of our analysis on the 
urban edge areas, were BGs tends to be larger and may encompass several 
residential schemes of various kinds as well as rural and/or desert areas.  
- Finally, many GCs do not produce strong discontinuities around the totality of 
their boundaries, but in most of the case on one or two sides only. Nevertheless, 
the few cases of discontinuities found between a gated block group and abutting 
neighborhoods are very significant, and quite often more than one or two 
standard deviation(s) above the average (see for instance the case of one large 
GC located North of Phoenix; another one on the South-east-side; and some 
other cases in Western Las Vegas). It is to be mentioned that these rare 
discontinuities often occur for different factorial dimensions at the same place, 
thus demonstrating the strong social structuring of these enclaves. 
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3.3 Do gated communities increase segregation? 
The influence of gates and walls on segregation is summarized Table 5. It compares the 
statistical distribution of SDIs for each of the three geographical levels: segments that 
match gated communities boundaries (Level 1); segments around block groups where 
one or more GCs are located (Level 2); and all segments, at the metro level for 
comparison purpose. 
 
Table 5. Level of discontinuities. 
Average Social Distance Index observed for each geographical level. 
Factor 1.       
City Los Angeles* Phoenix Las Vegas 
Interpretation of factor Socio-economic structure, associated with race and age 
Geographical level Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. 
Level 1. GCs’ boundaries 1,50 1,66 1,82 1,22 1,75 1,47 
Level 2. In the vicinity of GC 1,24 1,25 1,75 1,49 1,41 1,39 
Level 3. All segments in metro area 1,06 1,08 1,77 1,52 1,47 1,36 
Effect of GCs on local SDI 1,41   1,03   1,19   
       
Factor 2.       
City Los Angeles* Phoenix Las Vegas 
Interpretation of factor Life cycle & age 
Geographical level Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. 
Level 1. GCs’ boundaries 1,06 1,22 1,11 1,03 1,02 1,13 
Level 2. In the vicinity of GC 0,79 0,83 1,09 1,10 0,86 1,00 
Level 3. All segments in metro area 0,71 0,78 1,10 1,19 0,82 0,92 
Effect of GCs on local SDI 1,49   1,01   1,26   
       
Factor 3.       
City Los Angeles* Phoenix Las Vegas 
Interpretation of factor Ethnic segregation effect, regardless of social 
status 
Effect of age (young 
adults and children) 
Geographical level Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. 
Level 1. GCs’ boundaries 0,26 0,23 1,19 0,87 0,83 0,62 
Level 2. In the vicinity of GC 0,48 0,71 0,96 0,97 0,75 0,69 
Level 3. All segments in metro area 0,50 0,66 0,97 1,02 0,81 0,76 
Effect of GCs on local SDI 0,51   1,22   1,03   
       
Factor 4.        
City Los Angeles* Phoenix Las Vegas 
Interpretation of factor Age effect, regardless 
of social status 
Spatial isolation of 
Native Americans 
Ethnic segregation 
effect, regardless of 
social status 
Geographical level Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. 
Level 1. GCs’ boundaries 1,77 2,32 1,30 3,67 0,49 0,43 
Level 2. In the vicinity of GC 0,87 1,12 0,53 1,61 0,54 0,57 
Level 3. All segments in metro area 0,66 0,89 0,44 0,98 0,59 0,69 
Effect of GCs on local SDI 2,67   2,97   0,82   
*Data for the Los Angeles area provided for comparison purpose. See Le Goix, 2005b for detailed results.  
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In Phoenix, the impact of gated communities on segregation seems relatively low 
compared to previous results in Los Angeles. Indeed, according to factor 1 and 2, socio-
economic and life-cycle discontinuities between a GC (Level 1) and abutting block group 
is only 1,03 times more important than the average discontinuity at the metro level. 
Nevertheless, on factor 3, Phoenix’s GCs are more likely to build stronger discontinuities 
than any other BG’s vicinity in the rest of the metro area. According the ethnic 
segregation, regardless of social status, Phoenix’s GCs build “social walls” an average 
1,22 times stronger than the average SDI at the metro level. Furthermore, in a regional 
context where persons of Native American origin are likely to reside in urban areas, 
Phoenix’s GCs produce a segregation level on Factor 4 (Spatial isolation of Native 
Americans) 2,91 times more important than the average at the metro level. 
The reason why Phoenix’ GCs do not produce stronger SDI than metropolitan average 
patterns on factor 1 and 2 remains a speculative question, but a reasonable hypothesis 
would be that the segregation structuring of Phoenix being already so strong, GCs do 
not produce a significant shift in local socio-economic patterns at the block group level. 
The SDI being a standardized index, it might be useful to compare SDI in Phoenix and 
Los Angeles on factor 1: socio-economic segregation patterns, at all of the 3 levels, 
appear stronger in Phoenix than in Los Angeles (for level 3: 1,06 in L.A; 1,77 in 
Phoenix). 
 
In Las Vegas, segregation patterns produced by gates and walls (Level 1) and around 
GCs (Level 2) are much more comparable with patterns previously found in Los 
Angeles. On factor 1, the socio-economic SDI is 1,19 time higher near GCs than in the 
rest of the metro area ; on factor 2 (life cycle and age), GCs contribute to produce social 
differentiation patterns 1,26 times stronger than at the metro level. Whereas no 
substantial effect can be demonstrated on factor 3, we must mention than results on 
Factor 4 are consistent with previous findings in L.A. GCs in Vegas (factor 4) as well as 
in Los Angeles (factor 3) are not associated with race segregation. In Las Vegas, the 
average SDI for ethnic segregation regardless of social status is 0,82 lower than at the 
metro level. This concur in demonstrating that considering ethnic/racial status alone, 
GCs indeed locate within very homogeneous neighborhoods, and discriminate from their 
adjacent communities on the basis of age and socio-economic status. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
According to our spatial analysis of social distance the study of Phoenix and Las Vegas 
leads to several conclusions. First, the majority of GCs are built within areas of certain 
level of racial/ethnic and socio-economic homogeneity. Therefore, the study finds 
support for our first hypothesis. Secondly, it seems that GCs contribute to increased 
segregation. Our conclusion is that GCs reinforce the levels of residential segregation in 
Phoenix and Las Vegas. As shown in the analysis, GCs reinforce the segregation 
patterns through buffer zones: stronger social discontinuities cannot be found matching 
GCs boundaries, but at a certain distance of the walls. In terms of our second 
hypothesis, it seems that the evidence from this study support the place stratification 
model. GCs influence both the levels of racial and economic residential segregation.  
Thirdly, the residential patterns produced through the process of gating considerably 
differ in each metropolitan are studied.  In Phoenix, where core-periphery segregation 
patterns are very strong, GCs have a marginal effect on producing local segregation 
patterns, the more sensitive being the exclusion of Native Americans from gated and 
locked-in “small worlds”. In Las Vegas, GCs contribute to create more homogeneous 
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worlds according to socio-economic and age dimension, the same way Los Angeles’ 
gated communities do. 
In conclusion, it must be said that at a local level GCs follow the overall racial/ethnic 
patterns, specific to the level of racial residential segregation at each specific 
metropolitan area. Such a conclusion reiterates the importance of local buffer zone 
strategies, raised by developers, prospective buyers, municipalities and other actors of 
real estate markets: at a local level, GCs are homogeneous enclaves, within 
homogeneous neighborhoods in terms of ethnic and racial status. This statement clearly 
demonstrates the heritage of racial strategies and spatial patterns in urban development, 
real estate markets, and urban governance. 
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